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For the purpose of the argument in this paper, the principles 
for detei'Illin:t!g a critical region for an hypothesis will be considered 
to be of three kinds. 
(i) !~~-~1~~~~_!~§!-Er~2!E!~ 
The density under the null-hypothesis p0 (x) and a statistic 
T (x), expressing the degree of distrust of the hypothesis, are 
specified. With P0 (A) = J p0 (x)dx the hypothesis is reJected 
'A 
when T(X)>K, where P0 (T(X)>KlSE for any p0 consistent with 
the null-hypothesis. Of course this is the most comm~nly used 
"principle" in practical statistics, even if it hardly deserves to 
be called a principle. 
(ii) The Neyman-Pearson test principle __ _._. _______________ ..._. __ .... ____ _ 
This expresses a desire to have high power (i.e. probability of 
reJecting when the hypothesis is wrong) with a given level of 
significance. In some simple situations this would lead to a 
reJection region of the form p1 (X)>c p0 (X), where p1 and p0 
are some completely spesified densities unde~ the alternative to the 
hypothesis and the hypothesis respectively and c is adJusted to 
' the level of significance. 
(iii) ~_g~!.!!~r!~:~!.EE!.!!£!E~ [ 1] 
This consists in reJecting when p0 (X)<c, where c is adJusted to 
the level of significance (and X is a minimal sufficient statistic). 
It is hardly necessary to discuss the Neyman-Pearson principle 
here, its merits are well known. I shall therefore concentrate 
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on throwing som light on the Per Martin-L0f principle. Of course 
this principle is sweepingly more general than the two first 
mentioned . principles since it · disregarcs the alternatives except 
for the purpose of constructing the minimal sufficient X under 
the a priori assumtions. 
The principle will be elucidated by two examples. 
Example1. ~rd_2~~!~5-!e bE!~~~ 
The hypothesis is that all N =52 1/(13!) 4 combinations of hands 
are ~qually likely. If now the dealer gives himself (say) 13 
spades, one might become suspicious. This is not due to this hand 
being less likely than others, which it is not, but that according 
to the rules of the game this hand is favourable to a player. There 
are, in other words, other circumstances than those which follow 
from the density under the hypothesis that are taken into account. 
To be more precise let 
Gi ' G2 ' • • • Gr 
be r groups of four-hands-combinations which are such that all 
combinations x belonging to a fixed Gi are equally favourable 
to the dealer, whereas if x E Gi and x' E GJ with J>i then 
x• is more favourable than x to the dealer. It certainly would be 
a formidable (really prohibitive) task to determine G1, ••• ,Gr, 
but in principle they are given. Let 
r 
N1 ,N2, ••• ,Nr 1 (~Ni=N) 
be the number of four-hands-combinations in G1 ••• ,Gr respectively. 
We now let the test statistic be T(x), where T(x) is defined by 
T(x)=t if x E Gt• By the classical test principle ((i) above) 
the hypothesis {of no cheating) should be reJected if T(X) ia·; 
large. This seems rather obvious from the definition of T(x). 
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On the other hand it seems to be rather irrelevant whether 
NT(X)/N is large or small, i.e. which Gi containsfaw or many 
combinations. Thus it is the rules of the game, and a thorough 
knowledge gf t_he game of b_~i.£ige, which are regu:ir~ed to determine 
the test. The test can not be constructed from the hypothesis 
alone. (It may be of some interest~alize that little can be 
gained by specifying the class of distributie~when the dealer is 
cheating. Thus we have a test method "without power"). 
It is assumed that at most one out of thousand passengers is non-
paying (by cheating). In a certain area at certain times of the day 
it is however suspected that the ratio is much higher. Hence a 
cnne inspection is made in which the inspector finds the first non-
paying pass~nger after x checks. We have under the hypothesis, 
that the suspicion is unJustified, that 
Pr(X = x) = p0 (x) = p(1-p)x-1;x = 1,2, ••• 
where p = 0.001. Obviously the hypothesis should be reJected if 
X is small i.e. a non-paying passenger is quickly discovered. 
However, by the Per Martin-L0f principle the hypothesis should 
be reJected if X is large, since p0 (x) is a decreasing function 
of x. (Per Martin-L0f assumes that p0 (x) is constructed wholy 
by combinatorial methods starting from equally probable events. 
If this is an important part of the theory, one could assume that 
the number of passenger in the suspicious area is N and hence 
(a=Np) 
p 0 (x) 
N-x N 
= Pr(X=x) = (a-1)/( )= 
a 
=a (N-x)(N-x-1) ••• (N-x-a+2) 
N(N-1) .•• (N-a+1) 
which is still a decreasing function of x). 
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The present author has been used to think of the idea that 
the most unlikely events should result in reJection as "naive", 
arising among non-trained statisticians. He has felt that it is 
pre-Galileian in the sense that like the idea that the heavier 
bodies will attain the greatest speed, it is a natural misconception 
among earlier non-sophisticated physicists. 
The present author has still the same feeling and has felt 
it necessary to voice a dissident opinion, which is of course a 
reel{ less undertaking among so many prominent congratulants. 
Fortunelately it has been possible to keep the argument on an 
elementary level. 
Perhaps it should be mentioned that the idea of replacing 
likelihood ratios with entropy (or redundancy) has been developed 
in great detail in a book by Kullback [2] from 1959. His treatment 
is general in the sense that other alternatives to the hypothesis 
than the uniform distribution are allowed. 
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